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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from the denial of a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court of 
\Veber County. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
Hearing was held before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, on August 23, 1967, on the appellant's 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus to discharge her 
from the state industrial school and to release and dis-
charge her child from the custody of the state welfare 
department. The court denied appellant's petition for 
release and continued the petition for discharge of the 
baby until juvenile court proceedings had been com· 
pleted. On November 21, 1967, the juvenile court per-
manently severed the parental control of the appellant 
over the baby and the petition seeking discharge of the 
infant was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests the judgment of the Lower 
Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 1, 1966, appellant, Sandra 
Fay Cloud, ran away from her home and was beyond 
the control of her parents by staying out overnight, 
refusing to obey the reasonable requests of her parents, 
endangering her own welfare and the welfare of others 
by drinking alcoholic beverages and engaging in sexual 
relations with Gary Sigmon. 
On the 25th day of October, 1966, Mrs. Helen 
Cloud, Sandra Cloud's mother, was served with a sum· 
2 
mons requiring her to appear in .Juvenile Court before 
Judge Rcgnal W. Garff along with her husband and 
daughter Sandra to determine the action to be take:1 
against Sandra Cloud ( J .R. 200636). On November 
7, 1966, a hearing was held and attended by the appel. 
lant and her parents, Mrs. Barbara Leibroder, a juve-
nile probation officer, and the librarian of the medical 
records of the University of Utah hospital. 
Sandra Cloud admitted the above allegations and 
Judge Garff rendered his decision of December 12. 
The decision committed Sandra to the State Industrial 
School. Judge Garff suspended the commitment order 
on condition that Sandra would voluntarily go to the 
state hospital and receive medical attention (Findings 
of Fact Case No. 36372.) Sandra admitted herself to 
the state hospital, but on March 13, 1967, she endan-
gered her own welfare by leaving the state hospital con-
trary to medical advice. She was brought back to 
the Salt Lake County Detention Center. On March 25, 
1967, a summons was served on Mrs. Helen Cloud to 
appear with Sandra and Mr. Cloud on April 5, 1967. 
At the hearing on that date the appellant was repre-
sented by an attorney at law, Mr. Leland Ford. Also 
present at the hearing was Dr. Bernardo Garso, who 
testified to the progress of appellant and the reasons 
why she left the state hospital contrary to medical 
advice. At this hearing, Judge Garff enforced the com-
mitment of the appellant to the state industrial school. 
On June 21, 1967, a baby boy was born to the 
appellant at the Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital, Og-
3 
den, Utah. One day before the appellant's discharge 
from the Dee .Memorial Hospital, a hearing was held 
before Judge Ziegler which placed the infant boy in 
the temporary custody of the Children's Aid Society 
until the matter could come before the court at a late1· 
date. 
A hearing on the custody of the child was sched-
uled for August 8, I967, but was continued to Septem-
ber 5, I967, to allow the appellant, Sandra Cloud, ample 
notice of the hearing. The matter was again continued 
without decision to October IO, I967. The hearing com· 
menced through October IO, I967, and included No-
vember 21 before the decision was rendered. The court 
found Sandra lacked the necessary mental capacity to 
adequately care for the needs of the child and that her 
commitment to the state industrial school served as a 
further deterrent to her proper care for the child. 
(Record I00828 p. IO). 
Pursuant to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10· 
IOO ( 16) ( 1963), Judge Ziegler permanently termi· 
nated all parental rights of the appellant Sandra Cloud 
in her child and ordered the child placed for adoption 
in accordance with Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55· 
IO-I09(4) (I963). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
App ELL ANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS \iVERE NOT VIOLATED DURING 
4 
THE HEARING IN THE SECOND DISTRICT 
JUVENILE COURT, BECAUSE OF THE AP-
PELLANT'S VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF 
COUNSEL IN THE FIRST HEARING AND 
HER RETENTION OF COUNSEL AT THE 
SECOND HEARING. 
As to the appellant's contention that Sandra was 
denied the services of counsel this allegation seems 
untenable. At the time of the appellant's intial delin-
quency hearing, Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 85, 87 
S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 ( 1967), had not been 
decided and the Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-
96 ( 1963) was controlling the procedure followed in 
.Juvenile Court proceedings. The section required: 
Parents, guardians, the child's .custodians, and 
the child if old enough, shall be informed that 
they have the right to be represented by counsel 
at every stage of the proceedings. They have the 
right to employ counsel of their own choosing, 
and if any of them request an attorney and is 
found by the court to be without sufficient finan-
cial means to employ an attorney, counsel shall 
be appointed by the court. 
The proceeding conducted on November 7, 1966, 
in which the appellant was initially brought before 
Judge Garff is not included in the record and therefore 
in the absence of the record it is sufficient to assume 
there was a regularity of the hearing at which the appel-
lant received her constitutional rights and waived those 
rights. Blaine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 
( 1959) ; Ex parte Gutierrez, 122 Cal.App.2d 601, 265 
5 
P.2d 16 ( 195.Ji) ; Ex parte Hynes, 84 Cal.App.2d 746, 
191 P.2d 791 ( 1948) ; Ex parte Knight, 62 Cal.App. 
2d .582, 144 P.2d 882 (1944). 
At the supplemental hearing conducted on April 
5, 1967, the record shows that the parents had retained 
an attorney, l\fr. Leland Ford, to represent the interests 
of the appellant and her parents. The lack of evidence 
to indicate an irregularity at the November 7 hearing 
and the presumption of regularity over the proceedings 
seems to eliminate any claim of error the petitioner may 
have. In fact, the absence of counsel at the first hearing 
indicates that the appellant understood her constitu-
tional right to counsel and that she had apparently 
waived that right during the first hearing. This infer· 
ence finds support in United States v. Haynes, 386 
F.2d 375 (1967), where appellant at first had waived 
his right to counsel and then during police interrogation 
requested his right to obtain counsel. The court indi-
cates that the presence in the mind of the accused of 
his right to pass and then his subsequent move to obtain 
counsel indicates an understanding of his constitutional 
rights and a voluntary waiver of those rights. 
If appellant chooses to attack the waiver as defec· 
tive, she must bear the burden of proof to show that he 
did not competently and intelligently waive his right 
to the assistance of counsel, McGuffey v. Turner, 18 
Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967); Johnson v. Zerbest, 
304 U.S. 458 ( 1967). State t'. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 
361 P.2d 509 (1961), establishes the test that: 
6 
In order to find a waiver defective there must 
be evidence of fear or coercion, or any reason 
why he was induced to waive his rights other than 
he thought the course he took was for his best 
good. 
At no stage of the hearings is there shown to be 
any of the above mentioned characteristics. Quite to 
the contrary, there existed an atmosphere that was co· 
operative, friendly and responsive to the needs and 
concerns of the appellant and the violations she was 
charged with. 
Appellant contends that the Gault decision must be 
interpreted to be retroactive and then claims that the 
appellant was not given all of her constitutional rights. 
This contention is lacking a basis in both law and logic. 
The Ganlt decision, supra, has been held not to be 
retroactive in several cases, State v. Hance, 2 Md.App. 
162, 233 Atl.2d 326 (1967); Harnmer v. Maryland, 
3 Md.App. 96, 238 Atl.2d 567 (1967); Johnson v. 
State, 3 Md.App. 105, 238 Atl.2d 290 (1967). 
The decision to permit or restrict retroactive appli-
cation rests on numerous factors and has evolved over 
a period of time. The constitution neither prohibits nor 
requires retroactive application. The question of retro-
active application requires the court to weigh the merits 
and demerits of each case by looking to the prior history 
of the rule in question, its purposes and effects, and 
whether retroactive operation of the rule would extend 
or retard its operation. The court must remember, the 
7 
actual existence of the law prior to the determination 
of its unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may 
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The 
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial deter-
mination. Chicot County Drainage District v. Ba;rter 
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 ( 1940). 
In determining the operational effect of the rule 
the courts have weighed heavily the disruptive effect 
on the administration of our criminal law created when 
these new constitutional decisions have been handed 
down. In Johnson v. State, supra, the court found that 
retroactive application would seriously disrupt the 
administration of our law and would require the release 
of numerous persons found guilty by trustworthy evi-
dence in conformity with previously announced con-
stitutional standards. The same reasoning applies in 
this case. To hold that the Gault decision, supra, must 
be held retroactive would seriously disrupt our juvenile 
court administration and impose a tremendous burden 
unnecessarily upon the courts of this state. 
The Gault decision also laid out a test that there 
be no violation of due process of law or fairness. In 
contrasting the Gault decision with our case, there is 
a marked difference. In the Gault case there was police 
interrogation of appellant without counsel or the parents 
being present at any time, there was no notification 
given the parents of the custody of their child and no 
actual confrontation or adequate notice to have an 
attorney prepare his case. In this case the violation 
8 
occurred October 2, 1966, and the hearing was on No-
vember 7, 1966. The appellant had waived her right 
to counsel but secured counsel for the April 5 hearing 
and adequate notice was given by the authorities. There 
was no police custody or interrogation and there existed 
a cooperative atmosphere between the parent, appellant 
and the law concerned in the case. There is no room in 
this case for appellant to argue that the fair and due 
process called for in the Gault case was violated. 
A case similar and directly in point is Ex parte 
DeGrace, 425 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1968) where a 13 
year old juvenile sought release from the state training 
school in a habeas corpus proceeding urging that his 
rights established by Gault were violated. Nicolas 
De Grace was charged with drinking alcoholic bever-
ages, spending an entire evening at a motel cabin and 
he was later charged with drinking of alcoholic bever. 
ages on March 11, 1966; that he had been consuming 
alcohol for one year's time previously; that he had 
been truant from school on several occasions and that 
he was out of the control of his parents and was in need 
of cure and treatment of the court. 
On appeal before the Kansas City Court of Appeals, 
the court held the original proceeding to be constitution-
ally adequate. In that proceeding the court held that 
the statement made by the juvenile judge that "they 
(the appellant and parents) were entitled to be repre-
sented by a lawyer if you so desire," was sufficient 
a1lYice as to right of counsel, and the parents' refusal 
9 
of counsel in saying, "No, your honor, I think we can 
carry on without counsel," was a valid waiver of the 
right to counsel. 
Notwithstanding the retroactivity issue, an appli-
cation of the Gault standards demonstrate a failure 
of the appellant to bring to this court facts which would 
merit consideration under Gault. 
B 
Appellant contends that she was denied her rights 
because she was not confronted by witnesses against 
her or given the right of cross-examination of those 
witnesses. This contention lacks merit. The record of 
the second hearing shows that the appellant freely ad-
mitted the allegations against her. Once the appellant 
admits to the truth of the allegation and it is apparent 
from the record that the appellant knew and under-
stood the allegations against her and there was an 
absence of any force or coercion involved, the appel-
lant is deemed to have waived her right to confrontation 
and cross-examination. These rights have long been 
recognized as ones that can be waived by appellants. 
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Schick 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Kemp v. Gov-
ernment of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (1948). Being 
voluntary in nature and with no complaints about 
paternal urgings and police grilling, such cooperation 
with the law cannot be looked on as a denial of con· 
stitutional rights. State v. Aiken, 73 'Vash. Dec.2d 
305, 434 P.2d 10 (1967). 
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In addition to her waiver the appellant was con-
fronted by a witness against her interest at the supple-
mental hearing. Dr. Bernaldo Garso of the Utah State 
Hospital testified about the progress made by appel-
lant while she was at the hospital and that it was his 
professional opinion the appellant should have con-
tinued her presence at the hospital. This witn~ss firmly 
established that the appellant was not capable of caring 
for a child because of her low mental capacity, and 
that this appellant had left the hospital against medical 
orders. At the end of the witness' testimony, appellant's 
counsel declined the opportunity for cross-examination. 
It is clear from these facts that the appellanfs con-
stitutional rights were not violated. 
c 
In eliminating the appellant's claim that she was 
not advised of her right to remain silent, one must 
remember that the admission before Judge Garff was 
Yoluntary. The Gault case, supra, affirms as a test a 
high standard upon the prosecution to prove that t?e 
admission was not given under circumstances of coer:.. 
cion, suggestion or ignorance of rights, or in adolescent 
fantasy, fright or despair. In looking at the record arid 
the cooperative manner in which the hearing was con-
ducted, there is no evidence of any coercion, suggestion, 
fantasy, fright or despair. The hearings were conducted 
in the informal manner prescribed by the Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-26 (1963) and in the best 
interests of the juvenile concerned. 
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Appellant's contention that she did not have proper 
notice is entirely unfounded. She was brought before 
Judge Garff on November 7, 1966, after having re-
ceived the summons, served by .. Mrs. Liebroder, appel-
lant's probation officer, on October 27, 1966, at the 
Second District Juvenile Court Building. The presence 
of the appellant and her parents at the November 7 
hearing firmly establishes that she had proper notice. 
The summons for the hearing on April 5, 1967, 
was served to Mrs. Helen Cloud by a deputy sheriff 
on March 25, 1967. On April 5 appellant and her parents 
accompanied by their attorney, Mr. Leland Ford, 
were present and at this time the appellant's former 
commitment was reexamined and affirmed and she was 
committed to the state industrial school. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT OF THE FIRST 
DISTRICT IN OGDEN HAD THE AUTHOR-
ITY TO PLACE BABY BOY CLOUD OUT 
FOR ADOPTION AFTER THE PROPER 
HEARING AND TERMINATION OF PAR-
ENTAL RIGHTS HAD BEEN PROPERLY 
ADJUDICATED. 
Hearings before both Judge Ziegler, who placed 
the Baby Boy Cloud in custody of the Children's Aid 
Society, and those before Judge 'Vahlquist, who finally 
terminated the parental rights of appellant were both 
12 
within the proper scope of authority granted to the juve-
nile courts. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-77 
( 1963) lays out the exclusive original jursdiction of 
the juvenile court to cover proceedings: 
( 2) Concerning any child: 
(a) who is neglected or dependent child as 
defined by § 55-10-64. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-64 ( 17) ( 1963) 
defines neglected as including: 
( b) a child who lacks proper parental care by 
reason of the fault or habits of the parents, 
guardians or custodian. 
The juvenile court, in considering the detention 
of the appellant Sandra Cloud, plus the expert testi-
mony indicating mental instability in this person, did 
not abuse its discretion in terminating their parental 
rights. The court in so doing acted within the scope 
of the authority of the above statutes and acted in the 
best interests of all concerned. 
The juvenile court is given concurrent jurisdiction 
with the district court over all adoption proceedings. 
This concurrent right includes jurisdiction to appoint 
a guardian for the child and to determine custody in a 
habeas corpus proceeding. 1 
A further examination of Utah statutes reveals 
that the juvenile court also has the authority to commit 
a child to the state industrial school or other similar 
1 Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-78 (1963). 
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type institution, for varying terms of commitment or 
it may appoint a public or private institution or agency 
as guardian and further terminate all parental-child 
relationships. 2 The statute also sets the standards for 
termination to be the determination of whether parents 
are unfit or incompetent as shown through conduct 
or conditions which are seriously detrimental to the 
child.3 
In addition, the juvenile court acts have been con-
strued to be interpreted as broadly and comprehen· 
sively as is reasonable. In Deveraux v. Brown, 2 Utah 
2d 334, 273 P.2d 185 (1954), this court held: 
The juvenile court is given broad and c;ompre· 
hensive latitude and discretion in determining 
the custody of the child and its orders may range 
from mere temporary custody pending an in· 
vestiga ti on or hearing or to meet a temporary 
emergency; to an order intended to permanently 
deprive the parent of the custody of his child ~y 
committing the child to the custody of a child 
placement society to be placed with a family for 
adoption without consent of the parent1i. State 
In Interest of K.B., .................... , 7 Utah 2d 398, 
326 P.2d 395 (1958). 
CONCLUSION 
The record clearly reflects that the appellant was 
adequately advised of 
0
their rights to be represented by 
2 Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-100 (1963). 
3 Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-109 (1963). 
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an attorney and intelligently and effectively waived 
their right to counsel. 
Upon the conclusion of the proceedings she was 
committed to the industrial school and her infant child 
was permanently taken from her and placed for adop-
tion after the proper procedures were followed. 
Examination of the record shows that the appellant 
did not sustain her burden of proving the allegations 
upon which her petition was based. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial 
court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus should be 
affirmed and that the trial court findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and judgment be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD S. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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